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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
R.oYAL CAxxrxG CoRPORATION, a 
corporation, and CoNTINENTAL 
CAsrALTY CoMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL Co).IMISSION OF UTAH 
and DoROTHY ~1ARIE HuGHEs, 
Defendamts. 
Case No. 6383 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF 
,Defendants have made some assumptions of fact 
that are not in existence and .some conclusions as to the 
questions involved that do n·ot encomp·ass the issues so 
that it app,ears necessary to file a short reply brief. 
On page 3 of their brief defendants say: 
,,, Ap:parently then, the only questions to be 
determined in this case are (1) was the award 
so made by the Industrial Commission based upon 
substantial competent evidence, and (2) whether 
the application ·Of the ·law with respect to illegal 
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~· ~t ,. ,employment. in ~warding double .c~ompensation was 
.,.\ ... ·.-. . p~oper ~nd within the jurisdictiort, of the CoiA-
. ~-,,1 ': ' . . . • • ,., .. ' .. .. - . 
illlSSlOn. . 
Djs~ected with meticulous intensity thi.s statement mig)lt 
be stretched to· -cover- the issues involved. If read in its 
general terms';·- they far from state the matters with 
which we are ~concerned. 
- Firstly, the ·Commission awarded compensation on 
two hases, earning· capaeity to entitle the applicant to 
compens~tion in the ·one instance at ·$8.31 p-er week and 
in. the other instance on no basis at $16.00 per week. The 
defendants ohjected to neither basis, nor asked .for a re-
b-ea~ring. as to either one, and, therefore, as we understand 
the statutes and law of this state, they are precluded 
from doing anything further than defend the award of 
the c·ommission. we did not ohje.ct. to the $8.31 per 
week to the extent stated in our first brief, although as 
w-e view ihe situation, it is slightly higher than the ap-
plicant is entitled to. We did object to the $i6.00 per 
week award. It is not within the province of this court 
to fix an amount 9f ·Compensation. It either sustains or 
annuls an award. .Secondly, the Commission in fixing 
$16.00. went beyond .all or any of. its p.ower.s, and in fixing 
the Toss as severity-five per -cent .at the wrist completely 
dis-regarded the express -mandate of the Legislature. 
'1Jhirdly,; as to a l~gal employment, this is not a matter· 
b~~tween the :applicant and the -employer bu~t is a matter. 
in -which; the State; through i~s various agen:cies, enters 
the. picture. • 
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Defendants' brief so utterly fails: to ans~wer the 
points raised by us iri our ~rig·ina.l ln·ief.and So'· complete-
ly ignores the eases cited that at first we felt no necessity 
for a reply brief. But since "~e ~:onceive it our duty :t-6 
render to this c.ourt such assistance as we can, we ·shall 
undertake Yery briefly to point out several matter~,- in 
\Yhieh the defendants are completely at error. _ .. 
1
.:!\·: 
E·xhibits 3 and 4, pages 31 and -32 .of th.~: reeord, 
ShO\Y the hours Worked per day, the wages earp.~d p:e..r 
day and per week, and the total number of hours worked 
' - .· .. -- 1,, ' ' 
each day, not only for Dorothy Marie Hughes, .the: ap-
plicant here, but for the girls who -were employed with 
her in like work. They show a. period of two weeks··arfd 
sustain the. ·Commission in fixing the compensation at 
$8.31 per week. The defendants seem ·to place· so-rne 
stress upon the employer's first report of injury found 
at page 7 of the record. This report does state that sh·e 
was employed at a rate of pay -of 30 cents· per hour work~ 
ing seven days per week, but has nothing to sa.y· about 
the number of h.ours per day. Mr. -Stringham, manager 
of the plaintiff employer, indicated in what we have here-
tofore designate~_ in our primary brief as 3 .T. at ,"pages 
9-12 that the report is not- true. He clea.rly pointed -out 
tha.t no one could receive mo-re- th·an 30 cents an hour 
.on cherries and that the_ girls were only paid and ··were: 
hired with ·th·e. e~pre:ss under~tandi~g_ that their com~ 
pensation was based on the number of hours they a,ctually· 
worked, which was entirely -dependent .upon the ·avail-
ability of frui~ for canning; that in the work ·_that ;this: 
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applicant "\Va~ engaged in no one eould earn more than 
30 cents per hour. H·e .also stated that during the sum-
mer involved, no one made more than 30 eents an hour 
and that no ·One made more than the average of $15.00 
per week and that it would have been impossible to have 
made as high as $21.00 per week during that summer 
(3 'T. 15-16, 2'1). Tha.t ten hours a day was not a work-
ing day is ·evidenced by Mr. Stringham's testimony that 
bad there ibeen enough fruit, they would have worked 
the girls tw·elve hours a day, but there was not enough 
work (3 T. 8). 
As t.o this particular girl, however, she apparently, 
from the charts, was able to earn les·s than the other 
girls. That is horne out by her own testimony (3 T. 23). 
She. had several serious ·operations, which had nothing 
to ·do· with the accident, and one of the doctors in his 
report indicates that she was very frail and constitution-
ally inferior (R. 11, Report ,of Dr. Lindem). As a. m·at-
ter of fact, the .applicant herself knew that she was not 
employed on any basis of 30 cents an hour ten hours a 
day, s.even days a. week, in her own testimony (3 T. 6): 
'' Q. You actually didn't work seven days 
.a week and you didn't actually work eight hours 
a day~ 
A. I think I only worked as long as they 
had· cherrie.s. 
Q. You were supposed to be paid for the 
hours you actually worked~ 
A. Yes.'' 
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\\"'"hen it becomes .obviou~ not only from the testi-
mony of the en1ployer, but from the ·employee as well, 
that the fir~t report of injury is erroneous, it ean hnrdly 
be used as a basis of eYidenre. ·Thus we find no support 
whatever in the reeord for counsel's contention that her 
"rages ~hould be ba ~ed upon the basis of $21.00 per week. 
In addition, eounsel i~ no'v precluded from raising any 
such question by their failure to ask for a rehearing and 
bring the matter properly to the attention of this .c.ourt. 
A good deal is said by counsel, although its relevancy 
is questionable, about the applicant being placed at work 
where there "\vere no guards. The testimony is all to the 
effect that the applicant was placed on the side of the 
helt that \vas properly guarded; that had she stayed on 
the side of the belt where the forewoman placed her, or 
had she us-ed the stick provided by the employer with 
which to .dislodge the cherries, in either instance she 
would not have been injured. So there certainly can. be 
no penalty on us for the applicant's own disregard for 
her safety after she had been placed in a position of 
safety and given safety appliances which would have 
protected her had she used them at her work. 
The Commission's finding that the applicant, after 
her period of total temp.ora.ry disability, would be capable 
of earning wages to entitle her to $16.00 per week, he-
tween $2·6.00 and $27.00 a week, is almost too. absurd for 
comment. Even ·counsel for the defendants .admit that 
it is nons-ensical and the most that they ask for is com-
pensation based upon the $21.00 a. week, or $12.60 per 
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\Veek. In. view of the :fact that counsel themselves for 
thG defendants· concede the asininity of such a finding, 
the:rle1 should need ··little more be said about it. There 
isn·'t a word -of evidence in the record that the applicant 
\vould 'ever have been a.ble to earn a dime m-ore than she 
";as ~a,J.:r{ing at the time of the accident. The manager 
o~ 'th~ :plain~iff en1ployer, Mr. Stringham, said that they 
have girls who have been with them ten years who were 
jlist --~~poor a.s girls coming in, and that he knows nothing 
abo~t ]\{iss Hughes' ahili ty. H-e says that he doesn't 
J . ,· ·• 
know wllether the reason ~some girls made the maximum 
~va,s · )~eea use of their efficiency by reason of their long 
time ~~inpl9yment or efficiency by reason of actual ability. 
~·e; a·~es definitely say, however, that there is a question 
in .his mind t_hat applicant ever could have earned the 
. . 
niaxiinum of $21.00 per \\Teek because of her physical 
eondition (3 'T. 15-21). Mr. Stringham did state posi-
. ' ' 
tively ·~hat some of the girls who were working with Miss 
Hilg~~s·''were experienced and some of them were not 
and they all made about the same, but that there ~as no 
possibility whatever during that summer of any of them 
making more than as shown they did make by the tables 
heret·ofore referred to· (Exhil;>its 3 and 4). 
i . 
w As to; the -seventy .. five. per cent los~s at the wrist, 
C9Un~el .are a little va:gue in. t}leir. :r~ason~ Why this should 
be s~~tained::. _They clearly point out in_· their brief ,that 
tl'!~ a'f~rd is in. violat~on of th~ statute by sh~wing that 
th~,.award m~,st be suppor:t~d by· comip·etent evidenc,e .. and 
then. you ·only. apply it, for: additio¥a.l compensation to 
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any othe1· di~figure1nent or the loss of bodily function 
'not otheru'ise provided for herein. The ·record p:ointH 
out \Yithout dispute that thr applicant lost her thumb ·at 
the proximal joint and for this loss a specific recovery 
is provided, so it eouldn 't come under the definition .of 
any other disfigurement not ·other,vise provided for, be-
cause it is provided for. Counsel fail entirely to answer 
our arg-ument on this point, and of course the argument 
is unans,,.,erable as is shown 'hy our own statute and the 
cases we have heretofore cited. Even Dr. Rieken, from 
whom counsel quotes so.extensively, stated at 2 T. 7 that 
if she had lost the metacarpal bone completely, she would 
be \Yorse off than she is no,,~ and for the loss of th~ 
. . 
metacarpal bone completely, the statute only awards 
sixty \Yeeks, La\YS of Utah, 19·37, Chapter 41, page 80, 
whereas the Commission here has given nearly .<lo~ubl~ 
that. 
Counsel gives an illustration on pages 10 !and ll o~ 
a man "\Yho was ·moving machinery so that it destroyed 
his hand at the wrist, but the accident so injured the 
shoulder that the arm became useless. Well, that's n·o 
illustration at .all because the statute specifically takes 
care of that situation in the following language: '':One 
arm at or near shoulder, 200 weeks. In the above eases 
permanent and complete· loss of use shall be de-emed 
equivalent to loss .of the member.'' In this case· there 
is no ·evidence that she has lost the use of her hand but 
only the use of the thumb. In fact, Dr. Capener, one 
of her witnesses, stated his estimate of disability· wa·s' 
only because of .the ,possibility which might oecur in ~the! 
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future, while Dr. Hicken's whole evidence is shown to 
he based upon pure speculation and upon no legal tests 
recognized under our law. As w-e stated hefore, if the 
Commission ·may do as they have done here, and where 
the only thing is the loss of a specific member which is 
specifically provided for, and -call in doctors to estimate 
what the loss of that member means to the rest of the 
body, then the Legislature may a.s well repeal the statute 
and provide that compensation shall be ·such as estimated 
by the State Medical Society. 
·Counsel seemed to feel that in the double compensa-
tion award by the Commission only the rights of the 
applicant are involved. :Similar statutes, as we have 
already p·ointed ·Out in our former brief, have always 
been construed as penal statutes. The mere fact that 
the State has elected that the penalty shall go to the em-
ployee instead of to the treasury is of no m·om·ent. The 
Legislature had the power to provide that the penalty 
be paid into the ·State Treasury. It did not see fit to 
do so, but that does not deprive the State of its interest 
in this controversy. We still insist that it wa.s only by 
urging and insistence on the part of the ·State through 
its agencies that we found ourselves in the present pre-
dicament. We tried t.o eo operate to relieve unemploy-
ment. We tried to employ the people the ·State sent 
us. ·. We tri·ed to place them in a. safe place to work. 
We p·aid them the wages fixed hy law. We tried to get 
work permits. We p·ersisted in our efforts to secure 
proper certificates. We were prevented from complying 
with the la.w by agenc1es of the State :and it was not 
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because the applieant had no "·ork permit that she wa·s 
injured and it \Yas not because she could not have a 
\York permit that she \Yas injured because her associates, 
after her injury·, secured them, so there is nothing that 
"·e have done for \vhieh \Ye should he penalized and 
everything that we haYe done has ~been at the request of 
the State ·and eYerything we have been prevented from 
doing has been prevented by the State through its 
agencies. '': e therefore fail to see how Dorothy Marie 
Hughes, the applicant, has any part in this portion of 
the controversy. It is solely between us and the ~State 
as to whether the State 'v.ill exaet from us -a pe.nalty for 
its own delinquencies incurred in carrying out its own 
express desires. 
Counsel have cited a number of cases, which W·e 
have rea~ with care. The Utah case, North Beck Mining 
Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 58 Utah 
486, 200 P. 111, certainly doesn't sustain any :contention 
made by defendants. It discusses wh·ether or not an 
award should be ma~de where there ,is a loss of several 
fingers on the basis of loss of use or on the basis of the 
percentage of loss of fingers added together. We feel 
that the case is an authority f.or us because it states by 
inference that it is only when there is a. loss of more than 
one member that the question of loss of us·e becomes in-
volved. The other Uta.h ·case, Vukelich v. Industrial 
Commission of .Utah, ·62 Utah 486, 220 P. 1073, directly 
states '·'By providing a different basis of compens·ation 
for particularly· described injuries, thos-e injuries are to 
be excluded from general provisions which would other-
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Wise include them.'' That case l·S dire-ctly against 
.defendants. 
The two Pennsylvania. cas·es, Jensen v. Atlamtic Re-
fining Compa;ny, 105 .Atl. 545, and Rakie v .. Jefferson 
Coal & Iron Co., 105 Atl. 638,. are authority for nothing 
in this case because in those cases a statute provided 
that in ·construing total working days should he included 
days when an employe·e was prevented from working 
through no fault of his own. We have no such statute 
involved in this ·Case and the employee in her contract 
of employment very definitely knew that she was only to 
he paid for the hours she worked. 
The case ·Of Accord .County Coal Co. of Alabama: v. 
Bush, 109 So. 151, simply holds that an employer and 
an employee may make a settlem·ent without the cons·ent 
of the insurance company. The case does allow payment 
for days not worked where the emploY'ee was willing and 
able to work and there was no work for him, but concedes 
tha.t there is a .conflict in the authorities on this point 
and ;this conflict, as we h·ave already pointed out, is 
partially statutory, but it has no place in our case be-
cause here the ·employee went to work with a definite, 
fixed understanding. 
We therefore resp·ectfully abid·e by the prayer of 
our original ·brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHiiRLEY P. JONES, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs. 
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